Approved For Release 1989 1991 GIA RDR	82.00467.E007.100
INFORMATION REPO	
COUNTRY Italy	DATE DISTR. 19 MAR 51
SUBJECT Views of Italian Industrialists on the 1950-1951 Italian Invest- ment Plan	NO. OF PAGES 2
PLACE ACQUIRED 25X1A	NO. OF ENCLS.
DATE OF INFO. 25%	X1X SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.
The following are the reactions of certain 25X1X	n North Italian industrialists

## 1. Direct Investments by the State

The 600,000 million lire envisaged as direct investments by the State will be raised, it is hoped, by normal fiscal methods. A reform of the Italian fiscal system is not required to raise this money: an increase in certain taxes is all that is necessary. This can be put into effect by a simple legal decree or by a regulation issued by the Minister of the Treasury, approved by the Council of Ministers.

## 2. Investments Elicited by the State to be Supplied from Private Enterprise

Whether or not private enterprise will be able to contribute 420,000 million lire, under any pretext whatsoever, is a matter for skepticism. This is the most "sensitive" part of the whole plan. The businessmen concerned did not know the detailed plan of the Finance Commission, but stated that it certainly would appear that their criterion is not the quantity and importance of present output but the economic strength of the undertaking at the moment.

## 3. Private Investments

The private investments planned certainly were feasible at the moment that the plan was made out. The Korean situation had favored the merits of the plan and many Northern industrialists were prepared to invest a proportion of their capital even in industries outside their own, e.g., in the fields of metallurgy.

4. This aspect of the Pella Plan was based on the economic situation after July 1950. It did not specify the industries or branch of transport or agriculture in which the investments had to be made by individual industrialists. The initiative was left to them as to whether they decided to invest in

		_CLASSIFICATI	<u>on</u>	SECTION (	OITI	?OL - U	<u>, s</u>	. OFFIC	ML	3 ONLY		-	
STATE	X Ev NAVY	X NSRB		DIS	rribu	TION							
ARMY	X AIR	SEB1		00*									
,				CO1\	<b> </b>	DENT		Document			<u> 8</u>		
							-	No Chang				-	
							ı	Glass. Ch	ang	ed To: T	s s		
		ed For Releas						Auth.: 1	B.	3812 <b>1978</b>		5 <b>(</b>	6
	Approve	ed For Releas	se '	1999/09/0	09 :	CIA-RI	ЭŖ	82-0045	7R	<del>007100</del> 2	800	08-9	

m 2 m

ball bearings or milk cans or tinned meats, etc. Their individual judgment would decide whether to hope for an immediate or a long term profit.

- 5. It was dependent for its realization on the following factors:
  - a. The capitalist in question seeing a possibility of short term smortisation (2-3 years). This, in turn, needed a conviction or at least strongly suggested feeling, that Italy would not be invaded immediately, and the calculated possibility that if she were invaded, a line of defense on Italian soil could be a feasibility. Also, as an immediate consequence, the stabilization of the shares involved;
  - b. An element of certainty that the economic factors of the moment would contrive to exist. Otherwise there might be a flight of capital to foreign investments; and
  - c. A guarantee by the State that the product involved will follow the market prices rather than those of the cost of production. This needed formal protection by the State of possessors of capital invested under the Fella Plan.
- 6. Whether or not the Treasury will be able to invest the money allocated to the Flan

The 1,650,000 million lire envisaged under the Pella Plan represent a figure which is a necessity for Italy, not one which is ipno facto realizable. Pella has deduced the fact of their realization from their very necessity. That it will succeed, is not to be excluded from one's calculations. However, Milanese circles are far more optimistically than skeptically inclined to this possibility. The Treasury will not however, reduce expenditure on non-productive items to do this. Pella's policy has been a complete contradiction in this respect. It has been characteristic of the last three years to reduce certain items of State expenditure in order to bolster up the lira and at the same tame to increase non-productive expenditure, which will threaten the already slippery position of the currency. A reform of the Italian bureaucratic procedure to enable more money actually to be spent would take years of preliminary study and could only be put into effect gradually. It is not thought to be feasible at the moment. As regards the increase in the National Debt, this may be the inevitable solution. Industrial circles are inclined to think that this can be done, but they admit that it is the inevitable dilerma to know whether it could be treated as a "light increase" or whether this very increase would lead to the collapse of the lire. Anti-inflation measures have been barely considered, and it is the opinion of Milanese circles that if rampant inflation occurred, it would catch Italy totally unprepared.

7. Balance between Investments and Rearmament

The Italian experts are trying to carry out both tasks completely, including eventually the financing of armaments expenditure in the increase of national production. When asked whether the Italian Treasury could do this without assistance, or whether a loan from the World Bank would be required, the reply was given that a loan of \$550,000,000 from the World bank would be required.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURI/CONTROL - U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY